mirror of
https://github.com/Luzifer/vault-openvpn.git
synced 2024-11-14 02:52:44 +00:00
821 lines
23 KiB
Go
821 lines
23 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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// Package autocert provides automatic access to certificates from Let's Encrypt
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// and any other ACME-based CA.
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//
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// This package is a work in progress and makes no API stability promises.
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package autocert
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import (
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"bytes"
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"context"
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"crypto"
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"crypto/ecdsa"
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"crypto/elliptic"
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"crypto/rand"
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"crypto/rsa"
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"crypto/tls"
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"crypto/x509"
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"crypto/x509/pkix"
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"encoding/pem"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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mathrand "math/rand"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"time"
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"golang.org/x/crypto/acme"
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)
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// createCertRetryAfter is how much time to wait before removing a failed state
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// entry due to an unsuccessful createCert call.
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// This is a variable instead of a const for testing.
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// TODO: Consider making it configurable or an exp backoff?
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var createCertRetryAfter = time.Minute
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// pseudoRand is safe for concurrent use.
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var pseudoRand *lockedMathRand
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func init() {
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src := mathrand.NewSource(timeNow().UnixNano())
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pseudoRand = &lockedMathRand{rnd: mathrand.New(src)}
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}
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// AcceptTOS is a Manager.Prompt function that always returns true to
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// indicate acceptance of the CA's Terms of Service during account
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// registration.
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func AcceptTOS(tosURL string) bool { return true }
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// HostPolicy specifies which host names the Manager is allowed to respond to.
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// It returns a non-nil error if the host should be rejected.
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// The returned error is accessible via tls.Conn.Handshake and its callers.
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// See Manager's HostPolicy field and GetCertificate method docs for more details.
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type HostPolicy func(ctx context.Context, host string) error
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// HostWhitelist returns a policy where only the specified host names are allowed.
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// Only exact matches are currently supported. Subdomains, regexp or wildcard
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// will not match.
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func HostWhitelist(hosts ...string) HostPolicy {
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whitelist := make(map[string]bool, len(hosts))
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for _, h := range hosts {
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whitelist[h] = true
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}
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return func(_ context.Context, host string) error {
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if !whitelist[host] {
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return errors.New("acme/autocert: host not configured")
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}
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return nil
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}
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}
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// defaultHostPolicy is used when Manager.HostPolicy is not set.
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func defaultHostPolicy(context.Context, string) error {
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return nil
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}
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// Manager is a stateful certificate manager built on top of acme.Client.
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// It obtains and refreshes certificates automatically,
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// as well as providing them to a TLS server via tls.Config.
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//
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// You must specify a cache implementation, such as DirCache,
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// to reuse obtained certificates across program restarts.
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// Otherwise your server is very likely to exceed the certificate
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// issuer's request rate limits.
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type Manager struct {
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// Prompt specifies a callback function to conditionally accept a CA's Terms of Service (TOS).
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// The registration may require the caller to agree to the CA's TOS.
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// If so, Manager calls Prompt with a TOS URL provided by the CA. Prompt should report
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// whether the caller agrees to the terms.
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//
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// To always accept the terms, the callers can use AcceptTOS.
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Prompt func(tosURL string) bool
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// Cache optionally stores and retrieves previously-obtained certificates.
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// If nil, certs will only be cached for the lifetime of the Manager.
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//
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// Manager passes the Cache certificates data encoded in PEM, with private/public
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// parts combined in a single Cache.Put call, private key first.
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Cache Cache
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// HostPolicy controls which domains the Manager will attempt
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// to retrieve new certificates for. It does not affect cached certs.
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//
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// If non-nil, HostPolicy is called before requesting a new cert.
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// If nil, all hosts are currently allowed. This is not recommended,
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// as it opens a potential attack where clients connect to a server
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// by IP address and pretend to be asking for an incorrect host name.
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// Manager will attempt to obtain a certificate for that host, incorrectly,
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// eventually reaching the CA's rate limit for certificate requests
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// and making it impossible to obtain actual certificates.
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//
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// See GetCertificate for more details.
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HostPolicy HostPolicy
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// RenewBefore optionally specifies how early certificates should
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// be renewed before they expire.
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//
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// If zero, they're renewed 30 days before expiration.
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RenewBefore time.Duration
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// Client is used to perform low-level operations, such as account registration
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// and requesting new certificates.
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// If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with acme.LetsEncryptURL
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// directory endpoint and a newly-generated ECDSA P-256 key.
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//
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// Mutating the field after the first call of GetCertificate method will have no effect.
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Client *acme.Client
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// Email optionally specifies a contact email address.
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// This is used by CAs, such as Let's Encrypt, to notify about problems
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// with issued certificates.
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//
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// If the Client's account key is already registered, Email is not used.
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Email string
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// ForceRSA makes the Manager generate certificates with 2048-bit RSA keys.
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//
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// If false, a default is used. Currently the default
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// is EC-based keys using the P-256 curve.
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ForceRSA bool
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clientMu sync.Mutex
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client *acme.Client // initialized by acmeClient method
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stateMu sync.Mutex
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state map[string]*certState // keyed by domain name
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// tokenCert is keyed by token domain name, which matches server name
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// of ClientHello. Keys always have ".acme.invalid" suffix.
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tokenCertMu sync.RWMutex
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tokenCert map[string]*tls.Certificate
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// renewal tracks the set of domains currently running renewal timers.
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// It is keyed by domain name.
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renewalMu sync.Mutex
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renewal map[string]*domainRenewal
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}
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// GetCertificate implements the tls.Config.GetCertificate hook.
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// It provides a TLS certificate for hello.ServerName host, including answering
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// *.acme.invalid (TLS-SNI) challenges. All other fields of hello are ignored.
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//
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// If m.HostPolicy is non-nil, GetCertificate calls the policy before requesting
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// a new cert. A non-nil error returned from m.HostPolicy halts TLS negotiation.
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// The error is propagated back to the caller of GetCertificate and is user-visible.
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// This does not affect cached certs. See HostPolicy field description for more details.
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func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
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if m.Prompt == nil {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: Manager.Prompt not set")
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}
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name := hello.ServerName
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if name == "" {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing server name")
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}
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if !strings.Contains(strings.Trim(name, "."), ".") {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: server name component count invalid")
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}
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if strings.ContainsAny(name, `/\`) {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: server name contains invalid character")
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}
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
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defer cancel()
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// check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-SNI challenge
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if strings.HasSuffix(name, ".acme.invalid") {
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m.tokenCertMu.RLock()
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defer m.tokenCertMu.RUnlock()
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if cert := m.tokenCert[name]; cert != nil {
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return cert, nil
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}
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if cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, name); err == nil {
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return cert, nil
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}
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// TODO: cache error results?
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: no token cert for %q", name)
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}
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// regular domain
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name = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".") // golang.org/issue/18114
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cert, err := m.cert(ctx, name)
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if err == nil {
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return cert, nil
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}
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if err != ErrCacheMiss {
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return nil, err
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}
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// first-time
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if err := m.hostPolicy()(ctx, name); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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cert, err = m.createCert(ctx, name)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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m.cachePut(ctx, name, cert)
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return cert, nil
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}
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// cert returns an existing certificate either from m.state or cache.
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// If a certificate is found in cache but not in m.state, the latter will be filled
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// with the cached value.
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func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, name string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
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m.stateMu.Lock()
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if s, ok := m.state[name]; ok {
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m.stateMu.Unlock()
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s.RLock()
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defer s.RUnlock()
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return s.tlscert()
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}
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defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
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cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, name)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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signer, ok := cert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
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if !ok {
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return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key cannot sign")
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}
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if m.state == nil {
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m.state = make(map[string]*certState)
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}
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s := &certState{
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key: signer,
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cert: cert.Certificate,
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leaf: cert.Leaf,
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}
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m.state[name] = s
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go m.renew(name, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
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return cert, nil
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}
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// cacheGet always returns a valid certificate, or an error otherwise.
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// If a cached certficate exists but is not valid, ErrCacheMiss is returned.
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func (m *Manager) cacheGet(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
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if m.Cache == nil {
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return nil, ErrCacheMiss
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}
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data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, domain)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// private
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priv, pub := pem.Decode(data)
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if priv == nil || !strings.Contains(priv.Type, "PRIVATE") {
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return nil, ErrCacheMiss
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}
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privKey, err := parsePrivateKey(priv.Bytes)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// public
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var pubDER [][]byte
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for len(pub) > 0 {
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var b *pem.Block
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b, pub = pem.Decode(pub)
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if b == nil {
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break
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}
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pubDER = append(pubDER, b.Bytes)
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}
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if len(pub) > 0 {
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// Leftover content not consumed by pem.Decode. Corrupt. Ignore.
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return nil, ErrCacheMiss
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}
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// verify and create TLS cert
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leaf, err := validCert(domain, pubDER, privKey)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, ErrCacheMiss
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}
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tlscert := &tls.Certificate{
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Certificate: pubDER,
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PrivateKey: privKey,
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Leaf: leaf,
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}
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return tlscert, nil
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}
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func (m *Manager) cachePut(ctx context.Context, domain string, tlscert *tls.Certificate) error {
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if m.Cache == nil {
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return nil
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}
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// contains PEM-encoded data
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var buf bytes.Buffer
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// private
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switch key := tlscert.PrivateKey.(type) {
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case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
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if err := encodeECDSAKey(&buf, key); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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case *rsa.PrivateKey:
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b := x509.MarshalPKCS1PrivateKey(key)
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pb := &pem.Block{Type: "RSA PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: b}
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if err := pem.Encode(&buf, pb); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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default:
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return errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown private key type")
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}
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// public
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for _, b := range tlscert.Certificate {
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pb := &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: b}
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if err := pem.Encode(&buf, pb); err != nil {
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return err
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}
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}
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return m.Cache.Put(ctx, domain, buf.Bytes())
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}
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func encodeECDSAKey(w io.Writer, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error {
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b, err := x509.MarshalECPrivateKey(key)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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pb := &pem.Block{Type: "EC PRIVATE KEY", Bytes: b}
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return pem.Encode(w, pb)
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}
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// createCert starts the domain ownership verification and returns a certificate
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// for that domain upon success.
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//
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// If the domain is already being verified, it waits for the existing verification to complete.
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// Either way, createCert blocks for the duration of the whole process.
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func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
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// TODO: maybe rewrite this whole piece using sync.Once
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state, err := m.certState(domain)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// state may exist if another goroutine is already working on it
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// in which case just wait for it to finish
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if !state.locked {
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state.RLock()
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defer state.RUnlock()
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return state.tlscert()
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}
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// We are the first; state is locked.
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// Unblock the readers when domain ownership is verified
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// and the we got the cert or the process failed.
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defer state.Unlock()
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state.locked = false
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der, leaf, err := m.authorizedCert(ctx, state.key, domain)
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if err != nil {
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// Remove the failed state after some time,
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// making the manager call createCert again on the following TLS hello.
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time.AfterFunc(createCertRetryAfter, func() {
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defer testDidRemoveState(domain)
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m.stateMu.Lock()
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defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
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// Verify the state hasn't changed and it's still invalid
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// before deleting.
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s, ok := m.state[domain]
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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if _, err := validCert(domain, s.cert, s.key); err == nil {
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return
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}
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delete(m.state, domain)
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})
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return nil, err
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}
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state.cert = der
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state.leaf = leaf
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go m.renew(domain, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter)
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return state.tlscert()
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}
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// certState returns a new or existing certState.
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// If a new certState is returned, state.exist is false and the state is locked.
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// The returned error is non-nil only in the case where a new state could not be created.
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func (m *Manager) certState(domain string) (*certState, error) {
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m.stateMu.Lock()
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defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
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if m.state == nil {
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m.state = make(map[string]*certState)
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}
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// existing state
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if state, ok := m.state[domain]; ok {
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return state, nil
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}
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// new locked state
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var (
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err error
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key crypto.Signer
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)
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if m.ForceRSA {
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key, err = rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
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} else {
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key, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
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}
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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state := &certState{
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key: key,
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locked: true,
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}
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state.Lock() // will be unlocked by m.certState caller
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m.state[domain] = state
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return state, nil
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}
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// authorizedCert starts domain ownership verification process and requests a new cert upon success.
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// The key argument is the certificate private key.
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func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, domain string) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
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if err := m.verify(ctx, domain); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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csr, err := certRequest(key, domain)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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der, _, err = client.CreateCert(ctx, csr, 0, true)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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leaf, err = validCert(domain, der, key)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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return der, leaf, nil
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}
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// verify starts a new identifier (domain) authorization flow.
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// It prepares a challenge response and then blocks until the authorization
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// is marked as "completed" by the CA (either succeeded or failed).
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//
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// verify returns nil iff the verification was successful.
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func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, domain string) error {
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client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// start domain authorization and get the challenge
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authz, err := client.Authorize(ctx, domain)
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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// maybe don't need to at all
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if authz.Status == acme.StatusValid {
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return nil
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}
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// pick a challenge: prefer tls-sni-02 over tls-sni-01
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// TODO: consider authz.Combinations
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var chal *acme.Challenge
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for _, c := range authz.Challenges {
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if c.Type == "tls-sni-02" {
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chal = c
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break
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}
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if c.Type == "tls-sni-01" {
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chal = c
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}
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}
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if chal == nil {
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return errors.New("acme/autocert: no supported challenge type found")
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}
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|
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// create a token cert for the challenge response
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var (
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cert tls.Certificate
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name string
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)
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switch chal.Type {
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case "tls-sni-01":
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cert, name, err = client.TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(chal.Token)
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case "tls-sni-02":
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cert, name, err = client.TLSSNI02ChallengeCert(chal.Token)
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default:
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err = fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unknown challenge type %q", chal.Type)
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}
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if err != nil {
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return err
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}
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m.putTokenCert(ctx, name, &cert)
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defer func() {
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// verification has ended at this point
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// don't need token cert anymore
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go m.deleteTokenCert(name)
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}()
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|
|
// ready to fulfill the challenge
|
|
if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil {
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
// wait for the CA to validate
|
|
_, err = client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authz.URI)
|
|
return err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// putTokenCert stores the cert under the named key in both m.tokenCert map
|
|
// and m.Cache.
|
|
func (m *Manager) putTokenCert(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certificate) {
|
|
m.tokenCertMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.tokenCertMu.Unlock()
|
|
if m.tokenCert == nil {
|
|
m.tokenCert = make(map[string]*tls.Certificate)
|
|
}
|
|
m.tokenCert[name] = cert
|
|
m.cachePut(ctx, name, cert)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// deleteTokenCert removes the token certificate for the specified domain name
|
|
// from both m.tokenCert map and m.Cache.
|
|
func (m *Manager) deleteTokenCert(name string) {
|
|
m.tokenCertMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.tokenCertMu.Unlock()
|
|
delete(m.tokenCert, name)
|
|
if m.Cache != nil {
|
|
m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), name)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// renew starts a cert renewal timer loop, one per domain.
|
|
//
|
|
// The loop is scheduled in two cases:
|
|
// - a cert was fetched from cache for the first time (wasn't in m.state)
|
|
// - a new cert was created by m.createCert
|
|
//
|
|
// The key argument is a certificate private key.
|
|
// The exp argument is the cert expiration time (NotAfter).
|
|
func (m *Manager) renew(domain string, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) {
|
|
m.renewalMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
|
|
if m.renewal[domain] != nil {
|
|
// another goroutine is already on it
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if m.renewal == nil {
|
|
m.renewal = make(map[string]*domainRenewal)
|
|
}
|
|
dr := &domainRenewal{m: m, domain: domain, key: key}
|
|
m.renewal[domain] = dr
|
|
dr.start(exp)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// stopRenew stops all currently running cert renewal timers.
|
|
// The timers are not restarted during the lifetime of the Manager.
|
|
func (m *Manager) stopRenew() {
|
|
m.renewalMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
|
|
for name, dr := range m.renewal {
|
|
delete(m.renewal, name)
|
|
dr.stop()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *Manager) accountKey(ctx context.Context) (crypto.Signer, error) {
|
|
const keyName = "acme_account.key"
|
|
|
|
genKey := func() (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
|
|
return ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if m.Cache == nil {
|
|
return genKey()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, keyName)
|
|
if err == ErrCacheMiss {
|
|
key, err := genKey()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
var buf bytes.Buffer
|
|
if err := encodeECDSAKey(&buf, key); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if err := m.Cache.Put(ctx, keyName, buf.Bytes()); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return key, nil
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
priv, _ := pem.Decode(data)
|
|
if priv == nil || !strings.Contains(priv.Type, "PRIVATE") {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: invalid account key found in cache")
|
|
}
|
|
return parsePrivateKey(priv.Bytes)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *Manager) acmeClient(ctx context.Context) (*acme.Client, error) {
|
|
m.clientMu.Lock()
|
|
defer m.clientMu.Unlock()
|
|
if m.client != nil {
|
|
return m.client, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
client := m.Client
|
|
if client == nil {
|
|
client = &acme.Client{DirectoryURL: acme.LetsEncryptURL}
|
|
}
|
|
if client.Key == nil {
|
|
var err error
|
|
client.Key, err = m.accountKey(ctx)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
var contact []string
|
|
if m.Email != "" {
|
|
contact = []string{"mailto:" + m.Email}
|
|
}
|
|
a := &acme.Account{Contact: contact}
|
|
_, err := client.Register(ctx, a, m.Prompt)
|
|
if ae, ok := err.(*acme.Error); err == nil || ok && ae.StatusCode == http.StatusConflict {
|
|
// conflict indicates the key is already registered
|
|
m.client = client
|
|
err = nil
|
|
}
|
|
return m.client, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *Manager) hostPolicy() HostPolicy {
|
|
if m.HostPolicy != nil {
|
|
return m.HostPolicy
|
|
}
|
|
return defaultHostPolicy
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (m *Manager) renewBefore() time.Duration {
|
|
if m.RenewBefore > renewJitter {
|
|
return m.RenewBefore
|
|
}
|
|
return 720 * time.Hour // 30 days
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// certState is ready when its mutex is unlocked for reading.
|
|
type certState struct {
|
|
sync.RWMutex
|
|
locked bool // locked for read/write
|
|
key crypto.Signer // private key for cert
|
|
cert [][]byte // DER encoding
|
|
leaf *x509.Certificate // parsed cert[0]; always non-nil if cert != nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// tlscert creates a tls.Certificate from s.key and s.cert.
|
|
// Callers should wrap it in s.RLock() and s.RUnlock().
|
|
func (s *certState) tlscert() (*tls.Certificate, error) {
|
|
if s.key == nil {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing signer")
|
|
}
|
|
if len(s.cert) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: missing certificate")
|
|
}
|
|
return &tls.Certificate{
|
|
PrivateKey: s.key,
|
|
Certificate: s.cert,
|
|
Leaf: s.leaf,
|
|
}, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// certRequest creates a certificate request for the given common name cn
|
|
// and optional SANs.
|
|
func certRequest(key crypto.Signer, cn string, san ...string) ([]byte, error) {
|
|
req := &x509.CertificateRequest{
|
|
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
|
|
DNSNames: san,
|
|
}
|
|
return x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, req, key)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Attempt to parse the given private key DER block. OpenSSL 0.9.8 generates
|
|
// PKCS#1 private keys by default, while OpenSSL 1.0.0 generates PKCS#8 keys.
|
|
// OpenSSL ecparam generates SEC1 EC private keys for ECDSA. We try all three.
|
|
//
|
|
// Inspired by parsePrivateKey in crypto/tls/tls.go.
|
|
func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.Signer, error) {
|
|
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
|
return key, nil
|
|
}
|
|
if key, err := x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
|
switch key := key.(type) {
|
|
case *rsa.PrivateKey:
|
|
return key, nil
|
|
case *ecdsa.PrivateKey:
|
|
return key, nil
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown private key type in PKCS#8 wrapping")
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if key, err := x509.ParseECPrivateKey(der); err == nil {
|
|
return key, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: failed to parse private key")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// validCert parses a cert chain provided as der argument and verifies the leaf, der[0],
|
|
// corresponds to the private key, as well as the domain match and expiration dates.
|
|
// It doesn't do any revocation checking.
|
|
//
|
|
// The returned value is the verified leaf cert.
|
|
func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
|
|
// parse public part(s)
|
|
var n int
|
|
for _, b := range der {
|
|
n += len(b)
|
|
}
|
|
pub := make([]byte, n)
|
|
n = 0
|
|
for _, b := range der {
|
|
n += copy(pub[n:], b)
|
|
}
|
|
x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificates(pub)
|
|
if len(x509Cert) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: no public key found")
|
|
}
|
|
// verify the leaf is not expired and matches the domain name
|
|
leaf = x509Cert[0]
|
|
now := timeNow()
|
|
if now.Before(leaf.NotBefore) {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate is not valid yet")
|
|
}
|
|
if now.After(leaf.NotAfter) {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: expired certificate")
|
|
}
|
|
if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(domain); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// ensure the leaf corresponds to the private key
|
|
switch pub := leaf.PublicKey.(type) {
|
|
case *rsa.PublicKey:
|
|
prv, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key type does not match public key type")
|
|
}
|
|
if pub.N.Cmp(prv.N) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key")
|
|
}
|
|
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
|
|
prv, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key type does not match public key type")
|
|
}
|
|
if pub.X.Cmp(prv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(prv.Y) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key")
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown public key algorithm")
|
|
}
|
|
return leaf, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func retryAfter(v string) time.Duration {
|
|
if i, err := strconv.Atoi(v); err == nil {
|
|
return time.Duration(i) * time.Second
|
|
}
|
|
if t, err := http.ParseTime(v); err == nil {
|
|
return t.Sub(timeNow())
|
|
}
|
|
return time.Second
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
type lockedMathRand struct {
|
|
sync.Mutex
|
|
rnd *mathrand.Rand
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (r *lockedMathRand) int63n(max int64) int64 {
|
|
r.Lock()
|
|
n := r.rnd.Int63n(max)
|
|
r.Unlock()
|
|
return n
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// For easier testing.
|
|
var (
|
|
timeNow = time.Now
|
|
|
|
// Called when a state is removed.
|
|
testDidRemoveState = func(domain string) {}
|
|
)
|